



Disinformation Warfare: Understanding State-Sponsored Trolls on Twitter and Their Influence on the Web

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THERUSSIAINVESTIGATION

How Russian trolls manipulated American politics



By Marshall Cohen, CNN Updated 0220 GMT (1020 HKT) October 20, 2018

ARGUMENT

How Russia Sows Confusion in the U.S. Vaccine Debate

Not content to cause political problems, Moscow's trolls are also undermining public health.

BY KATHERINE KIRK | APRIL 9, 2019, 2:48 PM

SOCIAL TWITTER POLITICS

Twitter's list of 2,752 Russian trolls

From @10_gop to @ZzzacharyZzz.

By Dan Frommer | @fromedome | Nov 2, 2017, 11:45am EDT


Research Questions

- How do state-sponsored actors operate and evolve?
- How does the behavior of statesponsored trolls compare to random users?
- More importantly, what was their influence on the Web with respect to the dissemination of news?
 - Focus on Twitter, Reddit, 4chan's /pol/


Datasets


- Russian trolls dataset
 - Look for tweets from the 2.7K identified troll accounts
 - 27K tweets from 1K identified troll accounts
- Random dataset
 - Extract a set of 1K users that have "similar" posting activity as the Russian trolls
 - 96K tweets from 1K random users
- Influence Estimation Datasets
 - Twitter 1% Streaming API dataset
 - 4chan's /pol/ posts from Hine et al. (ICWSM'17)
 - Reddit submission and comments from Pushshift





Where are they allegedly posting from?





These days Twitter reports client information on each tweet

11:15 PM · May 10, 2019 · Twitter for iPhone

What hashtags they shared?


Trolls				Baseline			
Hashtag	(%)	Hashtag	(%)	Hashtag	(%)	Hashtag	(%)
news	7.2%	US	0.7%	iHeartAwards	1.8%	UrbanAttires	0.6%
politics	2.6%	tcot	0.6%	BestFanArmy	1.6%	Vacature	0.6%
sports	2.1%	PJNET	0.6%	Harmonizers	1.0%	mPlusPlaces	0.6%
business	1.4%	entertainment	0.5%	iOSApp	0.9%	job	0.5%
money	1.3%	top	0.5%	JouwBaan	0.9%	Directioners	0.5%
world	1.2%	topNews	0.5%	vacature	0.9%	JIMIN	0.5%
MAGA	0.8%	ISIS	0.4%	KCA	0.9%	PRODUCE101	0.5%
health	0.8%	Merkelmussbleiben	0.4%	Psychic	0.8%	VoteMainFPP	0.5%
local	0.7%	IslamKills	0.4%	RT	0.8%	Werk	0.4%
BlackLivesMatter	0.7%	breaking	0.4%	Libertad2016	0.6%	dts	0.4%

Account Evolution


Do Russian trolls change their screen names?

- 9% of the Russian troll accounts changed their screen name
 - Up to 4 times per account
- E.g., from "OnlineHouston" to "HoustonTopNews"
 - Clear attempt to pose as local news outlet
- In our baseline dataset 19% of the accounts changed their screen name
 - Up to 11 times per account

Do Russian trolls delete their tweets?




When did Russian trolls deleted their tweets?





Influence Estimation


How to *quantify* the influence?


- Hawkes processes
- Assume K processes
 - Each with a rate of events (i.e., posting of a URL), called the *background rate*
- An event can cause *impulse responses* in other processes
 - Increases the rates of other processes for a period of time
- Enables us to assess root cause of events























For our purposes

- Hawkes model with 4 processes
 - One for each platform/community of users (/pol/, Reddit, Twitter, Russian trolls)
- Use the a list of 99 news outlets from Zannettou et al. (IMC'17) to extract the URLs in each community.
- Distinct model for each URL; fit each model with Gibbs sampling
- Calculate the influence of each community

Influence results

- 1K trolls caused 2.6% of all Russian state-sponsored news outlets URLs (i.e., RT) on Twitter's 1%.
- 1K trolls caused 0.6% of all other news outlets URLs on Twitter's 1%.

	/pol/	Reddit	Twitter	Trolls				
/pol/-		R: 5.74% O: 8.15% -2.41	R: 0.71% O: 1.17% -0.46	R: 5.32% O: 9.07% -3.75				
Reddit -	R: 4.78% O: 46.78% -41.99		R: 5.57% O: 12.22% -6.64	R: 13.20% O: 57.15% -43.95				
Twitter -	R: 24.90% O: 9.14% 15.75	R: 16.66% O: 10.49% 6.17		R: 43.84% O: 51.53% -7.68				
Trolls -	R: 1.38% O: 0.72% 0.66	R: 3.13% O: 0.62% 2.51	R: 2.69% O: 0.61% 2.07					
	Destination							

Conclusions

- We find differences in the use of the Twitter platform between trolls and random users
- Trolls seem to reset their "personas" by changing names and deleting tweets
- Particularly influential in spreading Russian state-sponsored URLs on Twitter and other platforms

Follow-up Related Work

- Zannettou, S., Caulfield, T., Setzer, W., Sirivianos, M., Stringhini, G. and Blackburn, J., 2018. Who let the trolls out? towards understanding state-sponsored trolls. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.03130* (to appear at Websci'19).
- Zannettou, S., Bradlyn, B., De Cristofaro, E., Stringhini, G. and Blackburn, J., 2019. Characterizing the Use of Images by State-Sponsored Troll Accounts on Twitter. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.05997* (under submission).

Questions?

Everyone I Don't Like Is A **Russian Hacker**

The Emotional Child's Guide To Avoid Taking Responsibility For Your Crimes.

Days without winning



Raise your hand if you're under investigation!









